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Abstract. Research on the impact of the internet in the Middle East has been 
dominated by a focus on politics and the public sphere, and oscillated between the 
hope for ‘revolutionary’ change and the admission that regime stability in the 
region has not easily been unsettled by media revolutions alone. Obsession with 
the new and with the latest technologies has helped to obscure more long-term 
socio-cultural developments. This paper is a plea for a shift of paradigm: to study 
more seriously the social and cultural effects of internet and mobile phone use; to 
find out what impact the use of these media has on conceptions of the individual 
and its role in the construction of knowledge and values; and how these dynamics 
are embedded in more long-term historical developments promoting a greater role 
for the individual vis-à-vis established authorities. 
Revolution through the ever latest technology? 
Published research on the impact of internet use in the Middle East seems to be driven 
by a constant quest to discover some ‘revolutionary’ effect that the medium might have. 
The preeminent journal in the field, Arab Media & Society, was created in 2007 with 
the proclaimed goal of “Reporting a Revolution” (Pintak, 2007). Sure, those who 
believe unreservedly in the power of new media to change the world are mostly 
journalists or activists.1 Much of the academic literature has, over the past years, 
oscillated between the search for revolutionary developments and the admission that all 
too high hopes for radical political change have not been borne out. But this admission 
has not killed the dream. 
 In the 1990s, satellite TV was the projection screen for optimism; al-Jazeera 
became its emblem. Towards the end of the decade, with internet penetration in the 
region creeping towards the one-percent-mark, some placed their hopes for rapid 
change on the “information super-highway”; but when the dot-com-bubble burst and 
                                                 
1 Mona Eltahawy currently is one of the most eloquent of these; see 
http://www.monaeltahawy.com. 
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descriptions of the digital divide gained currency, it appeared that we were perhaps 
rather looking at “information without revolution” (Wheeler, 2010, 193; id., personal 
communication, 2004). 
 Change, however, was going to come. In 2005, blogging emerged as the new 
flame of hope in the Arab world.2 After blogs in neighboring Iran had blossomed in the 
wake of a state crackdown on the liberal press, and shown the potential of the platform 
to undermine state control over information flows (Alavi, 2005), Egyptian bloggers 
took the lead in the Arab world by publishing reports on police brutality that not only 
aroused international attention, but also led to a court case and the conviction of two 
police officers for torture – an unprecedented event in the country (Wāʾil ʿAbbās, 2006 
b; Anon, 2007).3 In a further step, bloggers were decisive in reporting about mass sexual 
assault on women during a religious holiday in downtown Cairo in October 2006, with 
the police not intervening and other media keeping quiet for three days (Al Husseini, 
2006).4 Eventually, this led to greater public debate about sexual harassment and to a 
draft law to combat the problem being introduced to the Egyptian parliament in January 
2010 (Abou el-Magd, 2010; Amro Hassan, 2009). While governments across the region 
demonstrated their nervousness by cracking down harder on bloggers, the “blogging 
revolution” (Loewenstein, 2008) did not topple a single régime, and by 2008, David 
Faris noted “a fatigue with Egyptian blogging” that he attributed to the hyper-
prominence of a few (three!) bloggers which made it “difficult for new voices to be 
heard”. 
 A saviour, however, had already appeared on the horizon: “Social networking sites 
where 12-year-old girls trade make-up secrets have become breeding grounds for 
revolution”, the co-editor of Arab Media & Society proclaimed (Pintak, 2008). 
“Facebook: the next generation” was regarded as the new way out that “might work 
better” for organizing social action, since allegedly it was more community-oriented, 
not least because it reduced the transaction costs for group-formation (Faris, 2008). This 
new enthusiasm was ignited by what in Egypt became known as the “Facebook Party”, 
founded, or so it was reported, by the “Facebook Girl”. Where traditional political 
parties had failed, Facebook groups were going to succeed, even if the people behind 
were blissfully unaware of the momentous change the researcher was uncovering: 
“revolutions without revolutionaries”. “Esraa Abdel Fattah probably had no idea she 
was going to create a global phenomenon when she started a Facebook group in March 
of 2008” (Faris, 2008). The group – membership of which exploded to over 70000 in a 
few weeks, or almost ten percent of all Egyptians on Facebook – was calling for 
solidarity with the 6 April strike planned by workers in Egypt’s largest public sector 
textile company. The workers’ strike was suppressed by security forces; the Facebook 
                                                 
2 Even podcasting, the latest craze in 2005, was not spared the question, “Will podcasting bring 
democracy to the Arab world?” “I think yes”, answered Mohammed Ibahrine (2005), then a 
doctoral student of communication and political culture in Hamburg. 
3 The two officers were released in 2009 after serving a reduced sentence, and reinstated into 
active service; an appeal against their reinstatement was turned down in Jan. 2010 (al-
Qirinshāwī, 2010). 
4 The story became public news after it was leaked impromtu on a popular satellite TV talk 
show (al-ʿĀshira masāʾan, on DreamTV; cf. Wāʾil ʿAbbās, 2006 a). 
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strike – which had called on people to stay at home – was interpreted as a success by 
eager commentators. A few critical voices pointed out that it was not entirely clear 
whether Cairo streets were emptier than usual on 6 April due to a sandstorm, combined 
with people’s fear of ending up in confrontations with the police. The Government, 
again, showed its wariness by arresting the Facebook Girl and pushing her into public 
submission. Pro-Government papers published an avalanche of articles denouncing 
Facebook as undermining the good morale of the Egyptian people. But activists 
themselves knew better. In particular, Ḥusām al-Ḥamalāwī of the International Socialist 
Tendency pointed out that it was grass-roots movement on the ground rather than a 
mouse click on Facebook what accounted for the making or breaking of a successful 
strike (al-Ḥamalāwī, 2008 c). And he was proven right faster than he may have wanted. 
In the wake of their 6 April elation, Facebook activists called for a strike on 4 May, 
President Mubarak’s eightieth birthday. When the call went unheeded, research 
concluded that “[t]he trouble with relying on past successes in social activism is that it 
often does not work the same way the second time around” (Faris, 2008). A year later, 
the “Facebook Revolution” was declared dead: “Facebook activism is now dismissed as 
useless at best, and the failure of the April 6th group to engender a lasting political 
movement has come to symbolize the futility of even trying” (Faris, 2009). The 
‘groups’ that were celebrated in 2008 as the Web 2.0 improvement on political parties 
due to the low transactions costs of forming them were now recognized to “engender 
extraordinary low levels of commitment” (Faris, 2009).5 
 Again, however, “some hope” remained. The failure of 6 April was only the “end 
of the beginning”, as a “closer look” would reveal. For Facebook was a mere 
digression; the “focus on Facebook also appears to have missed the apparent shift of 
online dissent from blogs to Twitter” (Faris, 2009). Twitter had already been noted in 
the aftermath of the 6 April 2008 events when an American student, James Buck, 
twittered his way out of police custody in Maḥallā. “Twitter Saves Man From Egyptian 
Justice” was the headline in TechCrunch, the world’s leading blog on Web 2.0 
technologies; CNN helped to spread the news to the whole world (Arrington, 2008; 
Simon, 2008). Hardly anyone commented on the fact that it was only the US citizen 
Buck, with legal help organized by his home university at Berkeley, who was released 
from the police station – his Egyptian translator stayed behind along with 42 others who 
had been arrested during the demonstrations. Even the otherwise skeptical Ḥusām al-
Ḥamalāwī, on whose blog news of Buck’s arrest were published two minutes after the 
original tweet (al-Ḥamalāwī, 2008 a), excitedly exclaimed: “The Revolution will be 
Twitterized” (al-Ḥamalāwī, 2008 b)! The dream of the “Twitter revolution” (Micek and 
Whitlock, 2008) materializing in politics was rekindled in Iran in 2009. internet guru 
Clay Shirky (2009) declared: “[T]his is it. The big one. This is the first revolution that 
has been catapulted onto a global stage and transformed by social media.” There we 
have it again, the “global stage”, the “global phenomenon” that Egypt’s Facebook Girl 
was believed to have created. But note that more than about actual events on the ground 
in Iran, Shirky was excited about how “the whole world is watching”, i.e. about how 
                                                 
5 Cf. the Egyptian blogger Sandmonkey (2009) who described Facebook activism as “[a] form 
of masturbatory self-congratulating cyber activism that doesn't really cost you any time or 
effort.” 
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Twitter allowed international media users the breathless feeling of receiving and 
forwarding minute-by-minute updates on unfolding events. Revolution here is in danger 
of being reduced to a mere media event. Meanwhile, régimes in Egypt, Iran, Moldova, 
China, Burma etc. have not been revolved away from power. – Hope, however, dies 
last. After the Twitter revolution has proven mostly a revolution for Twitter (Forte, 
2009), I will not be surprised if the next technological innovation engenders as much 
excitement and revolutionary expectation as the previous ones.6 
A preoccupation with the ‘new’ and the ‘political’ 
Why do I dwell on this for so long? Because I think that there is a pattern to how we 
have come to look at media impact in the Middle East, and that we need a shift of 
paradigm. The elusive quest for revolutionary effects of new media, where hope and 
disappointment alternate in rapid succession, is tied to a preoccupation with the new, 
exemplified in ‘new’ technologies and ‘new’ media, and a preoccupation with the 
political. Long-term developments reaching far back into history, and private and 
personal dynamics tend to fall off the radar in this view.  
 If we survey the main focus of extant research on the impact of the internet in the 
region, we find that it has mostly concentrated on 
 (1) political action (be it for democratization or for militant, and here chiefly 
Islamist militant, opposition); and 
 (2) news reporting: “Analysis on the role of new media in the Middle East has 
largely centered on how ‘citizen journalists’ can now set the agenda for news outlets, 
and how social media users repackage, comment on, and distribute content in 
innovative ways” (Ward, 2009). “[B]logs […] have challenged the privileged role of 
professional journalists by giving ordinary citizens platforms for mass dissemination, 
whether for a moment or a lifetime.  In recent years the medium has also become a form 
of protest and activism, a type of alternative media, and a source for mainstream media” 
(Radsch, 2008). 
 In other words – and simplifying a little for the sake of clarity – research was 
initially driven by a hope that the internet would be a decisive factor in changing 
politics in the region. When that hope did not materialize, research turned its attention 
to the ‘public sphere’. This is in line with the recommendation by Marc Lynch, one of 
the foremost Middle East media scholars, whose words on blogging may be generalized 
to include other internet forums: “Rather than focus on whether blogs alone can deliver 
democracy or a political revolution, analysts should explore the variety of ways in 
which blogs might transform the dynamics of Arab public opinion and political 
activism” (Lynch, 2007). 
                                                 
6 Cf. Faris (2008): “It might be necessary for [opposition activists] to constantly innovate, using 
new technologies, […]”. 
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Taking serious the social dimension of social media 
So politics and the public sphere have dominated research on the impact of the internet 
in the Middle East, and the quest for revolution has been focussed on fundamental 
change in politics and the media itself. Meanwhile, the influence of the internet in the 
social and cultural domains has been less in the limelight. One finds occasional 
observations on how mobile communication and social networking threaten established 
models for appropriate gender relations, and recently we have begun to see work on 
how literature (belles lettres) fares when published and consumed on the net. But 
overall, Walter Armbrust’s (2007) plea has so far remained largely unheeded: “The last 
thing I would like to see is a repetition of the sterile debate over the political effects of 
al-Jazeera carried out in academic analyses of blogs.” An “old and familiar concern for 
politics” structures much of Middle Eastern studies, including media studies, and has 
come “at the expense of the rest of the content” that is being communicated on the 
media. At a minimum – and still with an eye for public politics – Armbrust called to 
look at the internet “as a new phase in a long evolution in hierarchies of authority” and 
to investigate its complex effects on the social construction of authority in the region. 
These remarks are of prime importance if we want to address what Armbrust termed a 
“stagnation in the study of Middle Eastern media”. 
 What we need is not only to acknowledge but to take serious the fact that internet 
and social media are used for much more, and primarily for other than, political 
activism or citizen journalism. While researchers and activists dismissed Facebook after 
the failures of 2009, the platform has been steadily rising in popularity and is now the 
second or third most popular web site after Google across the Arab world — just as in 
the rest of the world.7 And it is primarily for maintaining and extending social 
relations and for entertainment that Arabs go on Facebook – just like the rest of the 
world. To maintain and extend social relations and seek entertainment has been a prime 
reason for starting to use the internet long before Facebook; in the old days, it was 
common to hear complaints that internet use was “80% chatting”, or cliché 
juxtapositions such as that while the West made good use of the net for learning and 
business, Arabs were wasting it for entertainment (Sāmiḥ M. Fahmī, 2006; 
arablibrarian, 2007). And who did such dismissive ideas come from? It was people of 
authority – parents, educators, ‘responsible’ journalists and researchers, police officers, 
etc.8 My point here is not that the observation that a lot of people were using the net for 
chatting and entertainment was wrong; it is the dismissive attitude towards this type of 
use. This is an attitude that attaches greater importance to the ‘serious’, the public, the 
political than it does to the private and the personal. It is an attitude that may be shared 
by people in authority, activists in opposition, and political scientists alike. It is an 
attitude that is betrayed even in innocuous statements such as in this quote from an 
                                                 
7 This is according to Alexa. In Feb. 2010, Facebook was the second-most popular web site after 
Google or other search engines in Morocco, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, and 
Bahrein. In Algeria, Saudi-Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, Oman, and Yemen, it came third 
after search engines and YouTube. In Tunisia, it was the most popular site of all. Only in Syria, 
where Facebook has been subject to filtering for years, it lagged behind, at rank 10. 
8 Hofheinz, interviews during field work in Egypt and Morocco, 2002-2005. 
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Egyptian blogger: “In most of other Arab countries blogs are personal not activist, 
Egypt is exceptional”.9 – Is this really a correct description of the Egyptian 
blogosphere? I posit that it would be more precise to say that in Egypt, the politically 
active bloggers have gained more political weight and attention than in many other 
Arab countries, but that doesn’t mean that the majority of blogs there are activist. 
Courtney Radsch (the researcher quoting the Egyptian blogger I just mentioned) must 
have realized this herself when she distinguished three phases in the development of the 
Egyptian blogosphere: after experimenting with the new medium (2003-05), activists 
exploited its full potential in particularly propitious political circumstances (2005-06); 
when these circumstances changed and the user base grew, the blogosphere after 2006 
diversified and fragmented into a wide variety of ‘circles’ that included “citizen 
journalists, non-denominational activists, leftists, Muslim Brotherhood and Islamists, 
culture and art enthusiasts, open source technology activists, English language political 
commentary and strictly personal.” However, even as she acknowledged that blogging 
became “commonplace”, Radsch continued to focus almost exclusively on the activist 
part of the blogosphere, thereby cementing the skewed image that the blogosphere is 
mainly about political and media activism. 
 And this is the problem. We acknowledge that chat, blogs, Facebook, not to speak 
of mobile phones, are increasingly becoming ‘commonplace’ in the Middle East. But in 
our research, we largely focus on a small subset of activist users while ignoring what 
chatting and facebooking do to the majority. We despair over the glacial pace of 
political reform (al-ʿUmrān, 2008) but do not know nearly enough about what the 
internet does to the dynamics between children and their parents, between younger and 
older generations, between individuals and authorities. Here is a quote taken from the 
world of literature to illustrate what Facebook does far away from politics. A publisher 
complained to BBC Arabic: “Dealing with the new writers, there’s a problem with 
them. But do the problems get addressed in the proper way? […] In the old days […] 
one would go to the publishing house, and the director of the publishing house, and if 
there was a problem, one would talk to the director. And if one couldn’t come to a 
solution with the director, then one would try and figure out what other options one had. 
But now we no longer have any of that. Now everyone as soon as they have a problem, 
they always go and put it on Facebook!” (Yaḥyā Hāshim, 2009). 
A change of attitude: individuals vs. authority 
There you have it. It’s the attitude that changes, the attitude of individual users towards 
authority, a disrespect or disregard for the long chain of authority, for established 
hierarchies that used to structure decision making. We find this attitude all over the 
Arabic internet; it is deplored by people in authority and positively asserted by ever 
more young users themselves. In the realm of religion, to take another domain, more 
and more people are asserting – sometimes implicitly, sometimes explicitly – their right 
to question and dismiss religious authorities. Like for example the “global mufti” al-
Qaraḍāwī, arguably one of the most high-profile and popular Islamic scholars of our 
                                                 
9 Egyptian blogger Abd Al Moneim Mahmoud, quoted in Radsch (2008). 
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time (a position he owes not least to the satellite TV station al-Jazeera) (Skovgaard-
Petersen and Gräf, 2009). He may be very popular, but his authority is in no way 
undisputed. “You mentioned Sh. Qardawy’s statement. Who is Sh. Qardawy? Isn’t he 
one like many others, since we have no clergy in Islam?” (Sameh Arab, 2001). Such 
attitudes are increasingly expressed as a matter of course on the internet. “Praise be to 
God – religion has been established by God and not by al-Shaʿrāwī or al-Qaraḍāwī [the 
two leading Islamic TV scholars since 1980], and if al-Qaraḍāwī and al-Shaʿrāwī err it 
doesn’t mean that the whole Islamic community follows them in their error” (Muṣṭafà 
ʿAbd al-Khāliq, 2009). Al-Qaraḍāwī himself bemoans a “tragic disappearance of wise 
and knowledgeable ulama [scholars] capable of properly basing their arguments on 
accurate testimony from the Koran and the Sunna. Their absence has given rise to 
inexpert, unqualified religious scholars and to disingenuous clerics […]. Under such 
anarchy anyone can sell himself as an Islamic sheikh, and such men have begun to give 
a religious verdict without scruple even on the most complex issues” (Polka, 2003, 7). 
Authority is threatened by increasingly being called into question, not by fellow 
authorities but essentially by ‘everyone’. “Kullu man dabba wa-habba aṣbaḥa 
yatakallamu fī ’l-dīn” – every Tom, Dick and Harry, every Aḥmad and Dīna have come 
to dabble in things religious, as critics complain (Yāsir, 2009). If everyone can read the 
Scriptures, everyone can use them to measure presumed religious authorities by the 
standards of these Scriptures – in practice, that is, by one’s own understanding of these 
standards. And this is what’s happening in internet forums every day, uncountable 
times. The attitude coming to expression there is one of no longer unquestioningly 
accepting what authorities decide but to check for oneself, come to one’s own 
conclusions, make one’s own decisions. This attitude is fostered by the structure of 
interaction on the net. On the net, it is the individual user who is doing the selection, 
who is choosing what to see and what not, and choosing what to forward and what not. 
This may be purely copy and paste, and if you will, completely unoriginal, but this copy 
and paste is what is increasingly important in today’s attention economy, and it does 
shape the cultural horizon of people, the horizon under which they act. It shapes what 
news they read and what they discuss and what they think is authoritative – all this is 
increasingly shaped by what links are forwarded to them by their friends on Facebook 
and what stories are dug on Digg, or what flies by them on Twitter. And so these 
forums, these arenas are places that we need more research on as far as Middle Eastern 
users are concerned in order to understand the precise dynamics going on there. But we 
can already see the structural elements that are important here and that are inherent in 
the code that structures communication on the net. Since it is individual users who do 
the picking and choosing and forwarding, they thereby become more important 
elements in the construction and reconstruction of cognitive and normative content – 
content pertaining to their social worlds, to religion, to culture, and yes, also to politics. 
Even those who are not adding their own voice but merely picking and forwarding, 
thereby become more important elements and more important actors in the social 
construction of knowledge than the likes of them have been before. “I’m a maker – not 
a taker” is a slogan spread by the “Life Makers” campaign of the televangelist ʿAmr 
Khālid, star among the young. This widely successful campaign draws on and aims to 
strengthen the attitude that ‘I can actually make a difference’, I can change things, at 
194 A. HOFHEINZ 
least in my own immediate circle, and the first thing I can change is the attitude that we 
can’t change anything anyhow. 
The weight of individuals: a generational evolution 
And it is here that we need to take serious the metaphor of ‘the next generation’. A 
breathless focus on the latest and newest technologies, often coupled with scarcely 
taking into account historical dynamics before the emergence of the ‘new media’ in the 
1990s, works to obscure the more long-term evolutionary developments. These are 
developments that happen over many generations, human generations. And what 
happens through generational change certainly is reflected by, and may be propelled by, 
new media technologies, but it has many more dimensions to it (Hofheinz, 2005). So 
what we need is to look beyond the latest in technologies and beyond politics and news 
reporting when it comes to assessing the influence the internet and mobile 
communication might have in the Middle East. And we need to think of the next 
generation in human terms at least as much as we think software generations. We need 
to look at what growing up with the internet does to the dynamics between younger and 
older generations. How it helps to increase the relative weight of communication with 
peers, and how that strengthens more critical or distanced attitudes towards established 
authorities. Implicitly but often also as consciously expressed by themselves, internet 
users develop 
• the feeling of being in greater control over what they want to read and look at 
• the ability to judge sources of information and authorities (‘I have the option, 
and the ability, and the right, to judge by myself’) 
• the opportunity to express themselves publicly, to be active participants in 
opinion-forming. 
This means that there appears to be a development towards a greater role [or at least: a 
greater (self-)perceived role] for individual users in the constitution of factual and 
normative knowledge.10 This is structurally reinforced via the mode of interaction with 
friends and peers in social networks, including social networking sites, and it means that 
the social self-evidence of established authorities becomes more volatile. Of course, 
authorities have at all times had to construct their authoritativeness through social 
processes; they have had to negotiate and legitimate their authority and prove it to the 
social groups that they wanted to influence. Today, the ‘crowds’ they need to take into 
                                                 
10 And lest we forget: these individual users are not one-dimensional entities, but human beings 
with multiple, negotiated, and performed identities. If we take this seriously, we need to make 
analytical room for the fact that Muslims, for example – and this includes Islamists –, do not 
only act as Muslims. This may sound like a truism, but in practice our research often focuses 
too exclusively on the religious dimension of actors in the religious field, and thus risks to 
over-simplify a more complex reality. Take for example the 16-year old Egyptian who was 
among the first to post a video of a TV talk show where the Grand Shaykh of al-Azhar was 
condemned for wanting to forbid the face veil  – previously, this young man had commented 
positively on romantic music videos (http://www.youtube.com/user/mastk333). This is in line 
with young users on Facebook who have no qualms declaring themselves fans of both 
Mohammed and Madonna.  
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account are becoming larger and faster than ever before. In other words, the general fact 
that crowds and authorities are in a mutually dependent dynamics has not changed, but 
the weight of crowds, and of the individuals that make up the crowds, has grown. So 
with the increasing spread of social media and mobile communication, the social 
networks of knowledge construction are becoming not only vastly bigger and quicker 
and less limited by space and locality than they had been before, but also less 
hierarchical. 
A development with roots in the eighteenth century 
However, when we look at what the internet does to the ‘next generation’ in human 
terms, we should not only have a longer breath but also a longer historical perspective 
than has hitherto been the rule in internet studies in the Middle East. Evolutions – 
which, as I am arguing, are more important here than short-lived revolutions – take 
time. They happen over the course of generations. And here I am not only talking about 
the future. I am talking about dynamics that can be traced back over the past three 
centuries of Islamic intellectual history. For the deconstruction of scholastic hierarchies 
and the promotion of a greater role for each individual believer is something that 
began to spread in earnest in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries already. 
Muslim preachers (using, by the way, the new technologies of the time, like pamphlets 
and vernacular language) tore down a key concept that had dominated the conception of 
religious authority for five centuries: that “the believer must be in the hands of his 
teacher like a corpse in the hands of the one who washes it”, and therefore obey and 
comply even if the teacher gives an order ostensibly in conflict with the prescriptions of 
the Divine Law, the sharīʿa. This was no longer acceptable to eighteenth-century 
reformers who worked to spread the idea that every believer had the right and duty to 
hold up presumed authorities to the standards of the Scriptures, and therefore 
encouraged everyone to go back to the Scriptures instead of relying on secondary 
sources. It dates from that time that growing numbers of people are actually reading the 
Qurʾān and holding up the Scriptures against established authority (Hofheinz, 1996). So 
what happens on the internet today is a continuation of a much older story, where 
individuals are encouraged to judge authorities by a generalized standard accessible, in 
principle, to everyone. Placed in such a wider historical context, the internet may loose 
some of its ‘revolutionary’ mystique – but this may be just what is needed to gain a 
more sober understanding of its impact in the Middle East. 
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